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Introduction
Patron-client relations affect politics in various ways, especially the efficacy and
implementation of policies. Whether much needed policies that could alleviate poverty,
ensure access to potable water, or promote equality becomes a reality depend on the
interests of patrons and clients. The complexities of patronage leads to questions about
corruption, meritocracy and institutionalization of bureaucracy, development and statebuilding, or even political ideology but the most important question is when and where is
patronage prominent. While in developing and corrupt countries patronage serves as the
foundation of the informal mechanisms of institutions, in other countries, patronage is
more covert. My research question is how does patronage politics affect policy change in
democracies.
Defining patronage has always been a major issue in the patronage scholarship.
Weingrod (1968) asserts that patronage has different meanings in political science and
anthropology. In political science, patronage refers to the distribution of jobs or favours
in exchange for electoral support; therefore, patronage is often associated with political
parties only. In this context, patronage only exists as a practice that political parties
employ in order to consolidate and/or maintain political power and dominance during
election cycles. On the other hand, patronage in the anthropological sense refers to an
unequal and reciprocal relationship between people. Even though the patron has most
power in relation to the client, both parties understand the need for the other in order to
survive. Sorauf (1961), Weingrod (1968), and Bearfield (2009) recognize the
ambiguities of the concept, citing its political science and anthropological significance
inside and outside of each discipline.
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Sorauf (1961) conceptualized patronage as an incentive system with far-reaching
political implications for political machines, voters, and politics in general. Weingrod
(1968) continues proposing the necessity for types of patronage as well as the importance
for creating a concrete definition. When Bearfield (2009) re-examined patronage, he reemphasized that differing definitions in political science and anthropology exist. Not
only that, he conceptualizes patronage as a practice when arguing that “patrons pursue
their...goals by invoking a variety of ‘patronage styles’” (Bearfield, 68). His arguments
for an anthropological examination of patronage still seem to be following a political
science approach since these styles are typically used in political contexts. On the other
hand, an operational anthropological definition opens up research opportunities beyond
political appointments into bureaucratic settings.
Even though Bearfield (2009) reimagined patronage as a concept and practice,
there still seems to be a delay in its acceptance across the field of political science due to
the negative connotation that civil service reform and scholars wrapped the term in over
time. This is significant because of how limited the current study of patronage is,
shrouding the ubiquitous and multifaceted nature of patronage. Fortunately, patronage
scholarship is now turning to developed countries. No matter where the concept is
applied, it seems that researchers find that patronage depends on the interests of the
person in power; therefore, whomever holds the most power also has greater influence in
politics (Beresford 2015; Holmes and Sunstein 2000).
In this paper, I argue that patronage can exist in any country in the world in the
context of global social inequality. While patronage politics in developing countries are
synonymous with corruption, such attributes are not generally associated with Global
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North although some levels of patronage politics or ‘political friendships’ are frequent in
these countries as well. To demonstrate the ways that patronage exists in democracies
around the world, I examine four democracies, two from the Global North and two from
the Global South. Canada and the United States (US) represent the Global North, and
Botswana and South Africa represent the Global South. Using news articles and
government websites surrounding a major issue in each of my four cases, I use qualitative
methods (document analysis) to analyze patron-client relations in order to determine key
actors in patron-client relations. My thesis is organized as follows. First, it traces the
origins of patronage as a concept and makes a case explaining why political patronage
deserves a new definition in the literature review. Secondly, it positions my assertions
alongside those made by previous scholars in my theoretical contribution. Here I
juxtapose democracy, patronage, policy change, corruption, wealth, and power to
demonstrate how these concepts interact in the Global North versus the Global South.
Next, it outlines how I set out to explain the connection between patronage and
democracy as well as my analysis of the interaction between wealth-based patronage and
democracy for each case study in the research design and analysis portion. Following a
detailed analysis of each case, the discussion portion situates these findings in the context
of the broader concepts of political patronage and democracy. Finally, this line of
research concludes with the implications of wealth-based political patronage and applies
it to the current state of global politics, namely the rise of populism and the decline in the
legitimacy of democracy in order to reaffirm the general applicability of wealth-based
political patronage.
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Literature Review
Literature on patronage politics mentions how it works negatively and promotes
corruption. However, it does not mean that we will see it only in corrupt countries. The
inner workings of patronage politics are complex and it can affect a wide variety of
regime types. Civil service reform labelled patronage as evil, destabilizing, and
unproductive. Caiden (1991) listed patronage as one of 175 common bureaupathologies,
comparing its existence to the destabilizing existence of corruption and favoritism.
Bureaupathologies are the “vices, maladies, and sickness of bureaucracy” (Caiden, 490).
This negative association between patronage and corruption also limits research to cases
where corruption exists. While Chabal and Daloz (1999) argue that patron-based politics
is how ‘Africa works’ and thus unable to achieve the level of electoral democracy that
exists in the west. Pitcher, Moran, and Johnston (2009) have noted that many African
countries actually have a hybridized political system that do not undermine democratic
processes or development.
Good governance and democracy literatures contend that competition serves as
the antidote to patronage. However, in some cases, competition among candidates
increases the likelihood and necessity of patronage (Driscoll 2017). Chazan et al (1999)
specifically highlight the fact that political patronage can assume a variety of forms. In
most cases, candidates and incumbents use campaigns and public office as a means of
personal gain. This results in heated competitions during election cycles. Dawson’s
(2014) earlier research on patronage from below also highlights how political
competition increases instances of patronage. Whether in the anthropological sense or
political science sense, patrons and clients recognize their interdependence. Candidates
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vying for power or incumbents wishing to maintain their position will do all they can to
appease their clients to gain power or maintain it as a result.
Despite the assumption that clients are unwilling participants, they are aware of their
place in the political hierarchy and often exercise their position more than their patrons in
the Global South (de Kadt & Larreguy 2018). Dawson (2014), Beresford (2015), and
Driscoll (2017) agree that in the context of global capitalism and unequal development,
this exercise of power by clients can prove potentially dangerous, and create newer forms
of patronage that are not covered by the traditional political definition. In Dawson’s
(2014) case, the citizens often protested when their needs were not met, which more often
than not resulted in the removal of that person from office. According to her, this creates
competition around vacant political positions and even contributes to the manipulation of
citizens so that political rivals can unseat each other.
Beresford (2015) asserts that competition and the expectation of loyalty and
reciprocity from elected officials contributes to gatekeeper politics, a manifestation of
patronage that consolidates power and leads to corruption and degradation of democratic
institutions. He also insists that as long as patronage, poverty, corruption, cronyism and
inequality exist, patronage will continue to dominate politics anywhere in the world. His
statement makes sense given that patronage, at its core, exists as a reciprocal, informal
arrangement between people of unequal power and authority. In the same vein, he argues
the importance of placing patronage in the context of the asymmetrical global capitalist
system which has effectively increased the power and influence of those who have
money to support campaigns. More competition seems like the perfect “remedy” to
patronage, but it is also important to remember that patronage is not the antithesis of
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democracy or bureaucracy, and that as a practice and concept it evolves based on the
environments it is rooted in.
Beresford (2015), Kopecky (2016) and (Ozei-Hwedie 2001) make the most
compelling arguments. We should understand patronage in the context of an unequal
system because it is in that inequality that people feel more reliant on their government to
secure the things they require. However, the delivery of these things can become trapped
in the rhetoric of politics and masked behind incomprehensive tax code on campaign
contributions. As highlighted in the case of Botswana, patronage becomes entrenched
when leadership remains in power for extended period of time (Ozei-Hwedie 2001). By
having more years in office, a party is more likely to succumb to patronage selfishly. Not
only that, they may be even less likely to provide public goods that would typically
require multiple terms to complete. Short term limits invite patchwork fixes to more
involved issues such as clean water and improved air quality, so we are more likely to see
construction projects as a result because those projects are indeed more visible to the
people (Povitkina & Bolkvadze 2019). These cases demonstrate the mutations that
patronage can make in certain contexts; thereby making it undetectable with current party
centric understandings of the term. With that being said, I feel that patronage does require
a more anthropological understanding so that we can see how these relationships –
between people and between people and the world the live – affect policies. My
theoretical contribution and analysis should demonstrate the political as well as the
anthropological aspects of patronage politics.
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Theory
With this paper, I argue that patronage is embedded in democratic systems,
covertly as well as overtly. The presence of patronage in democracies influence the rate
of policy changes because it is enmeshed with the interests of elected officials. The
ubiquity of patronage results from socioeconomic divisions – real or imagined – by all
actors engaged in the political arena. My focus lies in the relationship between actors and
the effect of said relationship on policies because of its semblance to the inner workings
of a democratic regime. My theoretical contribution is as follows: first I once again
address the significance of the limited scope of patronage and how that correlates to
conversations about patronage and democracy. Next, I provide an explanation of how
patronage works in the Global South and the Global North. This general explanation of
patronage in the context of these geopolitical zones includes the actors involved in
patronage as well as the symptoms of patronage which should be the same across the
board. Finally, based on my arguments, I lay out my hypothesis.
Limited Scope of Patronage
The literature presents democracy and patronage as two opposite regime types,
especially outside of the Global South (Caiden 1991; Bearfield 2009); therefore, many
scholars paint patronage as something endemic to the Global South (Chabal and Daloz
1999, Yaghi 2015), while only recently patronage studies have been extended to cases
outside the Global South (Kopecky et al). I argue that patronage can be embedded in
democratic systems covertly and overtly.
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Figure 1: Modus Operandi of Patron-Client Relations and Democratic Regimes Brown, 2020
As indicated above, patron-client relations and democratic regimes utilize a
reciprocal relationship between those in power and those with less power. Patrons and
candidates/incumbents often make promises to (or give) their clients and voters the things
they want in order to stay in office. The need to visibly fulfill the wishes of some of those
who voted them in is especially robust as the term limits are particularly short (Povitkina
& Bolkvadze 2019), and theoretically and realistically the power lays in the hands of the
people. These observations thereby refute arguments on the antithetical nature of
patronage on democratic regimes.
The recent interest in patronage outside the Global South shows the ubiquity of
patronage; however, our understandings of patronage require broadening beyond party
lines and financial support. Even though I make a case for a more comprehensive
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understanding of patronage, party loyalties and financial support laws still hold their
significance in relation to the modus operandi of patronage and present-day democratic
systems. For these reasons in conjunction with social inequality borne out of the global
capitalist system, I insist that we examine patronage through a reciprocal lens, and take
into account the changes in the actors in political arenas across the globe.
By combining anthropological and political science understandings of patronage,
I define and understand patronage as a reciprocal political quid pro quo between actors of
unequal power and authority. This interpretation of patronage includes all potential actors
in the political arena who have a stake in policy changes such as voters, incumbents,
candidates, nongovernment organizations and intergovernmental organizations, and
multinational corporations. In relation to my case studies, I utilize the reciprocal lens and
comprehensive delineation of patronage indicated here.
Patronage of the Global South
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Figure 2. Traditional Notions of Patronage - Brown, 2020
Most scholars characterize patronage in a simplistic fashion, with three main
actors (Dawson 2014). In Global South patronage cases, an actor’s place in the patronage
hierarchy also determines their position in the government hierarchy. The three actors are
patrons, brokers, and clients. Patrons are the most powerful because they possess all the
resources. For this reason, we typically associate patrons with the national government.
Brokers serve as liaisons between patrons and clients, just as the local government’s
critical role is to be the intermediary between citizens and the national government.
Brokers often switch between being a patron and client themselves, depending on their
position in the government hierarchy. Clients, on average, do not have as many resources,
and in some cases they lack power due to their socioeconomic status, but where they lack
resources they have an abundance on their impact of their continued interest in the
political arena. Voters in the Global South, quite particularly Africa, view their
government as an entity that should take care of them, so when their interests are not met,
the people readily vote out the irresponsive patron out for a patron who will be
responsive. This means that as long as patrons deliver, clients will continue to support
that particular patron’s campaign each possible time.
Patron-client relations instituted by former colonial powers hold the governments
of Botswana and South Africa together (Chazan 1999; Gordon and Gordon 2013);
however, it also makes these countries more susceptible to outside influences. Following
decolonization, colonial government structures still existed, including the local leaders
and the regions they were assigned. The indirect ruling of the colonial administrations
gave way to this representation of patronage flows because (1) the colonial
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administrations controlled the national governments, thereby consolidating power and
resources at the top of the hierarchy (patron), (2) colonial powers indirectly controlled
their colonies from afar by granting power to local leaders of their choice (broker), and
(3) this exchange between colonial powers and local people gave the colonial
administration more power and control over the local people while bestowing an
immense amount of power to local leaders and the people as well (patronage ‘from
below’). While indirect rule extends as much power to the people as democracy, it can be
easily disrupted by leaders with interests that have the potential to exclude most of the
population as well as persisting colonial sociopolitical cleavages (i.e. ethnicity and
wealth). More often than not, foreign companies slowly begin to capture states in the
Global South, with or without the knowledge of the leader, thus leading to unfinished
projects and increasing poverty, unemployment, and crime which can become push
factors for the people to emigrate to countries that have more opportunities. Many people
emigrate from the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region as well as Central and
South America to countries in Europe and North America because of the perceived
“cleanness” of the regimes. Unfortunately, immigrants are not truly escaping corruption
because it exists in the Global North too.
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Patronage of the Global North

Figure 3. Bureaucratized Patronage (Institutionalised patronage) - Adams 1982
The framework for traditional notions of patronage does exist in the Global North,
but they seem more evolved by bureaucracy and bureaucratic processes accompanying
democracies. According to Gordon Adams (1982), policies are trapped in something
called an “iron triangle.” His iron triangle includes Congress, the bureaucracy
(departments or ministries), and interest groups. Now that nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), and multinational
corporations (MNCs) have involvement in the political arena, voter interests can be
manipulated, and their significance to the patronage model is almost nonexistent. The
most active relationships flow between the actors of the iron triangle at the top of the
hierarchy, in other words, at the patron, or national level. Local level patronage does exist
in tandem to national level patronage in the Global North as well due to the introduction
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of new actors to the political arena. Despite the associations given to the Global South,
bureaucratic patronage in the Global North seems more pernicious due to its
undetectability.
Civil service reforms in the US and Canada made overt patronage a symbol of
corruption, so it was replaced with more covert forms of patronage such as party loyalty,
two party systems, and partisan ideologies. Political machines, spoils, and bossism of old
did not disappear. Instead it became more complex, entangled in tax code and case law.
Bureaucratic patronage plays on meritocracy, party loyalty, and ideologies on freedom
(individual and economic). This type of patronage also perfectly captures the inner
workings of Global North countries because of the association of political power and
economic power throughout history. Enmeshed in bureaucratic patronage are the interests
of businesses, and like incumbent parties in the Global South, conservative parties ensure
that they maintain their hold on power, whether they have a majority or not. Legal
maneuvers to maintain power and manipulation of the masses are what make patronage
in the Global North pernicious (Hacker and Pierson 2011; Gilens and Page 2014; Berman
2016).
Each actor in Gordon Adams’ “iron triangle” is vulnerable to business interests.
Interest groups are particularly vulnerable because many think tanks and other research
organizations are often funded by specific donors. Plus, any interest group can lobby
Congress if they have the resources to. As entrenched as business interests, wealth, and
politics are with history, it is out of the scope of this paper to explain the details behind
those contributing factors; however, the effect, systemic inequality, is not out of the scope
of this paper.
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Hypotheses on Patronage and Policy Change
Hypothesis I: if there is vast social inequality, then there is patronage
Hypothesis II: if the wealthy have more political influence, then there is
patronage
Patronage and democracy typically reflects the interests of the voters; however, all voters
are not made equal. Historically speaking, the wealthy have more political influence and
thus more ability to ignore laws due to their political connections (Holmes and Sunstein
2000; Gilens and Page 2014). Multinational corporations and other organizations headed
by the super-wealthy have the ability to shape voter behavior because of the immense
resources they can expend to do so.
Patronage and policy are linked because policies should reflect the interests of
voters. Policy changes and efficacy in democracies should ideally be inclusive and
applicable to the entire population, but that is not the case. In many cases, policies benefit
only a few. This disconnect here is where patronage becomes significant. If a democracy
is running as a democracy should, as in run by the people’s interests, then policies should
benefit all, thus rendering the power of sociopolitical cleavages irrelevant. Instead, builtin sociopolitical cleavages, case law equating individuals and corporations, pressure on
the Global South by the Global North (and other countries in the Global South) to value
democracy and wealth through foreign policies and supranational agendas have
exacerbated inequality, blazing a trail for the super-rich at the cost of ordinary individuals
and families (Chazan 2013; Gilens and Page 2014). Since patronage in the Global South
has its roots in sociopolitical inequality, and the Global North has a tendency to favour
wealthy business interests, policy change is often hijacked by the most politically
dominant group. I hypothesize that in the context of inequality, policy changes are a
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result of the politically powerful’s approval of it; therefore, policies that expand universal
access to public goods and services are often unlikely to be passed.
Research Design
In order to demonstrate the ubiquity of patronage, I examine two countries from
the Global North, Canada and the United States, and two countries from the Global
South, Botswana and South Africa. With these four cases, I investigate where the
loyalties of the administrations lie by monitoring their responses to increased demand for
energy infrastructure alongside increased demand for a greener economy and allegations
of money laundering and state capture. I use a qualitative method of analysis. For my
data, I rely on newspaper articles dated from the onset of the issue until March 1st 2020
in conjunction with speeches, readouts, and remarks by the Prime Minister and President
from their official websites serve as my primary sources of information for document
analysis. The amount of information available for the Global North and Global South
case studies varies considerably, but a second newspaper source is used to supplement
any national or intergovernmental acknowledgement of the events. By conducting
document analysis, I show the existence of patronage as well as discern the most
politically powerful group in each case.
Case studies: summary of issue and data sources for analysis
Table 1. CASE STUDIES
Country

Administration

Event/Issue

Data Sources

Canada

Trudeau (2015-)

Trans Mountain
Expansion Project
(TMX)

New York Times
pm.gc.ca

United States

Trump (2016-)

Keystone XL Pipeline

New York Times
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(KXL)

whitehouse.gov

Botswana

Khama (2008-2018)

National Petroleum
Fund money
laundering scandal
case

Botswana Gazette
Botswana Guardian

South Africa

Zuma (2009-2018)

State capture of South
Africa: Zuma-Gupta
relationship

Guptaleaks.com

Canada: Trudeau and the Trans Mountain Expansion Project
After making a public commitment to a clean energy economy, Liberal Prime
Minister Justin Trudeau approves the construction of the Trans Mountain Pipeline to fund
the transition. This decision shattered relations between British Columbia and Alberta as
well as divided Canada and the First Nations between those who support a strong
economy and those who support environmental preservation. Since Trudeau won the
2015 election on a completely different platform, this reversal seems puzzling. I use
seven articles from the New York Times and eight speeches and readouts from the
official Prime Minister site (pm.gc.ca) in order to find out why he made this choice and
how Canadians feel about it.
United States: Trump and Keystone XL
Despite the previous administration’s ruling that the Keystone XL pipeline would
hurt their credibility as a climate leader, shortly after inauguration, President Trump
invites TransCanada (now TC Energy) to resubmit the application for a presidential
permit. Trump approved the project, but it split the country, especially in the states that
will be impacted by the pipeline. To properly monitor the developments with this case, I
use 12 articles from the New York Times and seven remarks from whitehouse.gov.
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Botswana: Khama and NPF Scandal Case
Botswana’s National Petroleum Fund (NPF) served as a price cushion for
consumers, until funds were diverted. Khama has a role in this, as does the Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP), because they did not investigate the disappearance of the funds.
In fact, the disappearance of the funds is one of many failures of the Khama presidency.
At the start of his presidency, Khama made many plans and promises which turned out to
be hollow. To see who benefited from his failures, I use three articles from the Botswana
Gazette and five from the Botswana Guardian. Due to lack of information available at
embassy sites or on the Council for Foreign Relations, I chose two domestic newspapers
as data sources for my analysis.
South Africa: Zuma and Gupta relationship
The Zuma-Gupta relationship is indicative of what happens when the interests of
the wealthy trump the interests of your own people. The Guptas, an immigrant family
from India, came to South Africa in the nineties in order to start their own media firm.
This firm among many others came to fruition in South Africa, but it was not because
they were good businessmen. Their success came at the cost of the South African people.
Under Zuma, many projects stalled, which left thousands without salaries. In order to
figure out how the “Zuptas” came to be, I use four articles from Guptaleaks.com, an
investigative journalism site which is the result of the collaborative effort of four news
sources based in South Africa.
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Data and Analysis
Canada Case
Table 2. KEY ACTORS
Name/Title

Relevance to TMX issue

Prime Minister Trudeau

He nationalized the pipeline expansion, amongst three other
energy projects, despite campaigning as a proponent of clean
energy

British Columbia (BC)

TMX will twin a preexisting pipeline that runs through BC, thus
increasing tanker traffic near Burnaby and the likelihood of an oil
spill and subsequent disruption of British Colombia’s tourist
industry (environmentalist)

Alberta

Proponent of the pipeline as well as other energy projects being
brought to them because it will bring jobs (energy and economy
proponent)

Conservatives

Supports the project and criticizes Trudeau’s handling of TMX in
order to galvanize electoral support in the West to regain their
majority

Federal Court of Appeals
(FCA)

Determines whether legal cases concerning TMX are heard or
not, thus taking the political decisions surrounding the pipeline
project out of Trudeau’s hands

First Nations (indigenous
peoples of Canada)

Have the potential to gain economically or lose their lands and
water -- the First Nations have been divided on the issue,
bolstering the cases of both sides

The only clear beneficiaries seem to be Conservatives and Alberta, with
Conservatives regaining political power in Parliament and Alberta, essentially, gaining
power over Trudeau and any other Liberal. Due to skepticism over Trudeau’s interests
and Alberta’s seemingly ignored economic condition, Alberta and Saskatchewan voted
Conservative in 2019. Even though Trudeau’s Liberal Party still has enough seats to
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remain in power, they lost the popular vote which is indicative of citizen discontent and
the obligation of Trudeau to lay out clear policies instead of enacting ones which make
everyone happy.
Despite some faith in Trudeau’s government that things will be taken care of,
Trudeau cannot directly extend anything to anyone without backlash. Due to rising farright conservatism, Trudeau played it safe by letting the FCA determine how TMX
progresses. Even though his plans for TMX to serve as the money generator for the clean
energy economy transition, it seems he has a plan no matter which way public opinion
sways. On the other hand though, his moderate position seems more costly politically
considering that he won over Canada with a Liberal platform. 1
His reversal raises many questions on the politics in Canada, but one thing is
clear: TMX is a symbol. By supporting a clean economy and protesting TMX, you are a
Liberal, while supporting the energy infrastructure and economic growth that TMX can
bring makes you a Conservative. These ideological fault lines lie at the heart of the entire
issue in Canada. It does not seem that Trudeau needed to appeal to the West, the
Conservative heartland, considering what his victory meant (Puzic 2015). However, on
the same day he made his pipeline announcement in 2016, he also announced other
policies that his government had implemented: Natural Resource Project, Ocean
Protections Plan, and the Alberta Climate Leadership Plan. The other three plans clearly
follow the Liberal ideology, but he approved TMX and the Line 3 Replacement Project.
Why did he do that?

1

See appendix
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With the data available, there are not many answers, but his attempt to please
everyone in order to maintain his status as Prime Minister is much appreciated from a
strictly theoretical sense. My interpretation suggests that the Conservatives and the
Canadian West, mainly Alberta and Saskatchewan, are the most politically powerful in
Canada. This could be because of how much they contribute financially to the
government of Canada in taxes relative to the rest of the country. If Alberta and
Saskatchewan do not support policies put forward by the Prime Minister, the plans will
fall apart. This explains why Trudeau agreed to TMX as long as Alberta committed to the
national carbon tax (Alberta Climate Leadership Plan). Even though Trudeau has
prepared a way for Canada to make the necessary transitions to a clean energy economy,
his plans may be checked by Conservatives at the provincial level.
US Case
Table 3. OPPONENTS AND PROPONETS FOR KXL PROJECT
Opponents

Proponents

Sierra Club

ProPetrol (TX based company)

National Resources Defense Council

Enbridge (Canadian company)

Nebraskan landowners

TC Energy (Canadian company)
CEO of TC Energy Russ Girling (Canada)

Native Americans

Jim Carr (Canadian
American Petroleum Institute: Robin Rorick
and Jack Gerard (US)
Heartland Institute: Tim Huelskamp (US)
Nebraska Governor and Chamber of
Commerce
President Trump & Republicans
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Figure 4. US Patronage Network
Many scholars discussing patronage situate it as a phenomenon endemic to the
local level; however, the US may be providing evidence of the first instance of patronage
at the national level with the Republican monopoly on government. Unlike Trudeau,
Trump did not reverse course on his campaign promises, but his actions to ensure energy
infrastructure projects come to fruition benefit him and people in his administration more
than it does the people. As stated before, voters and candidates/incumbents are no longer
the only people in the political arena; thereby making voters more susceptible to
influences that affect their voting habits and ideals. With the drastic difference between
red and blue states, as well as the very real and perceived social distance of people in
these states, actors with a product to sell can easily prey on these inequalities. Despite
evidence from the New York Times saying that the pipelines do not bring as many jobs
as proponents trumpet, Americans value working and making money, especially if they
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need it to survive, no matter the industry.2 Like Canada, the US also has its liberalconservative dichotomy playing out through KXL, except conservatives are Trump’s
base. Playing to his base is not problematic in and of itself unless you closely examine
each policy choice he and his party have made. According to FiveThirtyEight, the House
and Senate Majority leaders opposed a bill requiring the EPA to issue regulations
regarding certain chemicals (2020) and preserving 400,000 acres of land in Colorado
(2019) while supporting motions to repeal rules requiring energy companies to reduce
waste and emissions as well as repeal of the stream protections rule in 2017. Where
Trudeau tried to find a happy medium in this dichotomy, there is no medium in the
United States. Conservatives often describe environmental regulations as an impediment
to industry, which is why Trump implemented two executive orders: one gives him
supreme authority over pipelines, the other limits the ability of states to fight pipelines.
Trump actions, as well as the Republican Party’s stance on energy demonstrate that their
interests are not with the people as they claim. It is quite safe to say that they wish to
enrich the corporations whom they bail out politically as the patronage triangle as well as
the US patronage network explains. Many of the proponents of KXL are also potential
beneficiaries of profits if the project comes to fruition. Broadly, the US and Canada both
can expect gains from this project, despite allegations about the risk of spills; however, a
variety of people have their say on what side they are on regarding KXL.

2

Leslie, Jacques. 2018. “Do Pipelines Really Create Lots of Jobs?” New York Times, May 10.
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/10/opinion/environment-pipelines-jobs-carbon.html
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Botswana Case

Figure 5. Botswana Patronage Network

Figure 6. Flow of funds from National Petroleum Fund (NPF)
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Botswana is often a model that other countries in Africa should be able to achieve
if they follow the same steps; however, it may be a better idea if other African countries
do what is best for themselves rather than follow Botswana. Ian Khama is only a snapshot
into the decades of systematic corruption and state capture under the Botswana
Democratic Party (BDP). When P230 million disappeared from the National Petroleum
Fund (NPF), it seems as though that was Botswana’s final straw dealing with the
trappings of destabilizing patronage.3 According to publicly obtained correspondence,
Former Directorate on Intelligence and Security Services (DISS) Director General Isaac
Kgosi wrote to the Department of Energy Affairs asking that P230 million be diverted
from the NPF to the DISS for fuel storage. Former Acting Permanent Secretary Dr.
Obakeng approved the diversion, but later reversed, which were used for two things: (1)
paying Israeli security company Dignia Systems and (2) a transfer payment on behalf of
DISS to Khulaco. According to the Botswana Guardian, there is no guarantee if Khama
or the Israeli government knew about the contract at all since Kgosi is not talking. It
seems that the Fund had been looted twice, once in 2017 when P250 million disappeared
and last year, in 2019 based on the Botswana Gazette. More recent sources indicate that
P230 million disappeared from the Fund, launching domestic petrol prices into chaos
amongst the rising unemployment and discontent. This second looting and its possible
connections to former president Khama and current President Masisi have given way to
debates about the use of state institutions for political gain. Even though Masisi is not my
focus for Botswana, he did campaign on ending corruption. Could his fight to end

3

P230 Million = 230 million pula
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corruption, something that has blemished Botswana’s credibility as a model, all be just a
ploy for his political gain?
Their infighting is fracturing the BDP, leading to splinter parties. With the BDP
weakening due to factional disputes, it gives power to the other parties that do exist in
Botswana, but that does not mean that the BDP has lost all power. The BDP led
Botswana out of the colonial era, uniting all Motswana in their common goal to be
liberated, so one could argue that people see the BDP in the light from the sixties instead
of for what it has become today. For some reason though, despite the more fumbling
under Khama, the people voted in Masisi, another BDP candidate. Part of the BDP’s
organization is all the money that it has, most likely from diverting funds from critical
infrastructure and illicit business deals in diamonds, mining, and oil. Foreign direct
investments (FDI) gave the businesses that helped develop Botswana more political
power than the people themselves, opening the country up to be manipulated into poverty
and abuse of power by its own officers as we can see here. Many of the suspects in the
NPF looting also have companies in which they are directors. Whether it was two
lootings or not, Kgosi only accounted for P118 million in 2018, leaving over P100
million unaccounted for. This proves that there is evidence of corruption and patronage is
apparent with the main beneficiaries being elected officials and their families and
businesses. In 2019, Botswana pumped half a billion into the NPF. Permanent Secretary
of the Ministry of Minerals, Mmelta Masire revealed that Botswana owes P800 million in
debt to companies. While Botswana has debt to a number of companies, its elite had
properties and luxury items from the monies laundered from the NPF. Botswana is not
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demonstrate a model that other African countries should copy. In fact, it is following the
Global North model into economic, partisan, and ethnic chaos.
South Africa Case
Table 4. KEY ACTORS
Name/Title

Relevance to State Capture

Ashu Chawla and Naresh
Khosla

Gupta agents that falsified and backdated documentation for
Indian nationals’ work visa with their start-up company,
Sahara

Gupta brothers

Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh extended favours to many elected
officials, helped get people into power, brought in many
Indian immigrants to work in South Africa

Bell Pottinger (Tim Bell)

PR Firm in England that started the white monopoly
narrative to stoke racial tensions in hopes to distract from
the state capture

Duduzane Zuma

Son of President Zuma, billionaire and shareholder in a
Gupta company, key decision maker and connection
between Guptas and President Zuma at the time

President Jacob Zuma

Allowed the Guptas to control government job posts

State capture by businessmen seems like a trend in Africa, which makes sense.
Many foreign governments invest into mining companies, oil companies, and any other
natural resource or business venture that African countries can offer them, usually at the
cost of the integrity of the political structure. During Zuma’s regime, he and his family
got tangled up with the Guptas, a family of three brothers from India who came to start a
media firm. The connection could have begun with the involvement with Bell Pottinger
or when the Guptas gave Duduzane Zuma a director position in one of their firms, but it
seems that the Guptas snuck into South Africa by falsifying documents. 4 How their

4

McKenzie, Roy. 2018. “#Guptaleaks: How Sahara handed SA Jobs to Foreigners.” Guptaleaks, Sept 20.
https://www.gupta-leaks.com/information/guptaleaks-how-sahara-handed-sa-jobs-to-foreigners/
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interests became entangled with Zuma’s presidency is not particularly clear with the data,
but the same thing in Botswana can be said for South Africa: other interests have
captured the state, plunging the rest of the country into crime, poverty, and dilapidation.
Despite the underpinnings of ideology shaping interests, the Guptas seem to have
made their way to South Africa, interacting with the former president in limited instances
until they had gained control of the government. Their connection to the Zumas led to the
appointments of their cronies and special treatment which is sometimes illegal in South
Africa.5 For all intents and purposes, the Guptas were just using South Africa for their
own personal use, extending gifts to the Zuma family from time to time and helping
modify public opinion with the PR Firm. Gupta websites began disseminating a narrative
citing a white monopoly on the economy as to why the allegations against the Guptas
arose, thus inciting racial tensions in South Africa. Their efforts did fail, and now
everyone knows about state capture in South Africa, which has received negative
feedback from the US especially. There seem to be no policies, no positions, only gifts
and favours back and forth. The interests served are of the wealthy and not of the people,
but these wealthy people are not from South Africa, and therefore not sympathetic of the
political issues in South Africa.
Discussion
Patronage works differently in different countries, but it does exist, in some form
everywhere. In the Global North, patronage seems to lie in the wrappings of ideology
while in the Global South patronage networks often feed foreign patrons rather than
domestic ones. The relationships in Global North are based on political and financial
5

See appendix: South Africa, “Why you should care about #Guptaleaks” and “#Guptaleaks: The
Presidency Captured”
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support from organizations and people respond to favours because of their need for
money in their personal lives. Global capitalism enriches the Global North at the cost of
the Global South. In other cases, countries within the Global South often work against
each other to achieve a status similar to countries in the Global North, as evidenced by
the state capture of my two Global South cases by immigrants from another country in
the Global South. Unfortunately, where the Global North operates discreetly behind
ideology, the Global South operates blatantly due to the lack of development and rampant
corruption. Voters all across the world are suffering as a result of patronage networks, but
that is more true for the US, Botswana, and South Africa.
There is no difference in how patronage works in any democracy, “developed” or
“developing.” While Trudeau cannot be implicated as the culprit based on the datasets,
his actions show that conservative ideology governs Canadian energy interests, despite
evidence of the dangers of continued usage. As he unites Canada for the future, local
premiers focus on his mishandlings of generous energy projects, citing how much he
hates the west and other stereotypes in order to win Parliament. This strategy led to the
election of Donald Trump in 2016 in the US. By presenting himself as an outsider and a
man for the people, he overtly campaigned to build more pipelines and strip away limits
to economic growth (dog-whistle for environmental protections). Considering the
evidence of the danger that brings, much of his campaign promises have been realized,
including the streamlining of energy projects and the rollback of over 90 environmental
regulations. During the time that he overtly campaigned on conservative ideology, he
covertly used legal maneuvers as well as powers granted to the president to ensure his
promises were realized. The building of pipelines, which bring jobs and economic
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growth, would ensure his reelection, as well as continue the reign of conservatives at the
national and local levels. Unfortunately, unrestrained economic growth comes at the cost
of human rights and the environment, barriers that many business leaders and interest
groups wish to ignore. The data shows the bureaucracy and interest groups at work, but
Trump’s rhetoric and the two most powerful republicans in Congress are necessary to
ensure their clients (wealthy business owners who funded their campaigns) stay happy
and continue to “vote” for them in the future. Big business interests tangling with politics
seems a bit more obvious in the Global South, but without the entire story on how
political fights began and why, it is a little more difficult to discern the influence o
dominant political parties over time; however, the relationships are there, outwardly,
between business moguls and elected officials in both Botswana and South Africa.
Botswana’s elite are directors of companies implicated in the case against those
responsible for looting the NPF. On the other hand, Zuma’s presidency became muddy
when his troublesome son became entangled with the Guptas through one of their
companies. Whether or not he knew is no longer a question considering the meetings and
the gifts given to close members of his family.
Each case study proves that patronage exists and it does benefit the few at the cost
of the majority, despite the majority’s vote on certain policies. Even if votes went in the
correct direction so to speak, that manipulation is the handiwork of patronage network
actors, those with the most political power (and economic power). With their power they
sway public opinion with firms or with ideologies, maintain business interests and
political ones, and destroy the fabric of society and democracy. The only good thing
about the existence of patronage is the fact that it exposes those at the top of the hierarchy
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for who they are, creating more informed and transparency-hungry voters. The
connections between wealth and power can be explained a million times over in this
paper, but those connections lay at the heart of patron-client relations and democracies
everywhere. Who the “the people” are in a democracy ultimate determine who will be
heard politically. As we can see, it is no longer the common man, or even the middle
man, but the richest men with all their wealth and power generated over time through
deliberate unequal systems imposed across the globe.
Conclusion
Patronage has many different understandings, and while they are mostly negative,
there is no difference between patron-client relations and democracy. By looking at the
Global North and the Global South, it is evident that patronage has evolved. Where it has
stayed overt, it has become covert in line with connotations about patronage. The covert
nature of patronage is hidden, but no different and destabilizing as the most overt forms
found in the Global South. The nature of patronage, covert or overt, has major effects on
the lives of normal people. TMX has the potential to destroy the Pacific Coast. KXL will
bring benefits to 35 people permanently, but only during construction will employment
and economic growth surge. The NPF has been looted twice, raising petrol prices in an
era of chaos for the common man under Khama. The Guptas’ dealings with former
president Zuma undermined the institution, but they started many companies that favored
Indian immigrant work over South Africans. It does not matter how it works, because it is
there and has been since colonisation.
This line of research raises many questions about ideology, history, and the
meaning of “the people” in democracies across the world. While it has cast conservatives
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in a bad light, it opens doors into research into the connection between conservative
ideology and patronage networks. There has already been research done with the
connection between state-building and patronage, but the Global South often imitates the
Global North, why is the visibility in patronage so different? Is it seriously connotation as
indicated here? Clearly, there is some psychology behind how people understand how
their government works. By continuing this line of research, policies that benefit the
common man can become more common in order to close sociopolitical gaps that often
transform into social and/or ethnic tensions usable by corrupt officials. Patronage
research, outside the typical patronage cases, are crucial for all people. Populism,
plutocracies, kleptocracies, and far-right conservatism is rising and faith in democracy is
waning as a result of the patronage networks contributing to these new political
arrangements. The policies that the most powerful in the world support only benefit them,
and they selectively choose which groups of common people to extend benefits to after
the fact.
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Appendix
DOCUMENT DATASETS

Canada
Source(s)

Source Type Source Information
Author
Location*

Title

Date

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Ian Austen

Canada approves expansion of controversial
Trans Mountain pipeline

6/18/19

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Ian Austen

Canadian court halts expansion of Trans
Mountain oil pipeline

8/30/18

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Ian Austen

Canadian government to buy Kinder
Morgan’s Trans Mountain pipeline

5/29/18

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Ian Austen

Justin Trudeau approves oil pipeline
expansion in Canada

11/29/16

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Ian Austen

In Canada, 2 provinces feud over pipeline:
will it bring jobs or spills?

4/14/18

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Ian Austen

Trudeau won the election, but hasn’t won
over western Canada

11/20/19

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Ian Austen

A Victory in court for pipelines, but the
debate still continues

2/7/20

pm.gc.ca*

Speech

Ottawa, Ontario

Trans Mountain expansion will fund
Canada’s future clean economy

6/18/19

pm.gc.ca*

Speech

Ottawa, Ontario

Prime Minister state on the Trans Mountain
Pipeline Project

4/15/18

pm.gc.ca*

Readout

Ottawa, Ontario

Prime Minister speaks with Premier Horgan
on agreement on the Trans Mountain
Expansion Project

5/29/18

pm.gc.ca*

Readout

Ottawa, Ontario

Prime Minister speaks with Premier Notley
on agreement on the Trans Mountain
Expansion Project

5/29/18

pm.gc.ca*

Readout

Ottawa, Ontario

Prime Minister Trudeau, Deputy Prime
Minister Chrystia Freeland, and Special
Representative Jim Carr meet with Calgary
Mayor Naheed Nenshi

11/21/19
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pm.gc.ca*

Speech

Ottawa, Ontario

Prime Minister Trudeau’s pipeline
announcement

11/29/16

pm.gc.ca*

Speech

Houston, TX

PM Speaking notes for the annual
international gathering of energy industry
leaders

3/9/17

pm.gc.ca*

Speech

Davos, Switzerland

Prime Minister keynote speech at the World
Economic Forum 2018

1/23/18

United States
Source (s)

Source Type

Source Information
Author
Location*

Title

Date

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Clifford Krauss

Trump signs order to speed up oil and gas
pipeline construction

4/10/19

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Mitch Smith

Keystone XL pipeline plan is approved by
Nebraska Supreme Court

8/23/19

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Eric Lipton and
Danielle Ivory

Trump says his regulatory rollback already
is the “most far reaching”

12/14/17

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Eric Lipton and
Danielle Ivory

Under Trump, EPA has slowed actions
against polluters, and put limits on
enforcement officers

12/10/17

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Clifford Krauss

Keystone XL Pipeline: A New opening but
what lies ahead

1/26/17

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Lisa Friedman and
Coral Davenport

Judge blocks disputed Keystone XL
Pipeline in setback for Trump

11/9/18

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Mitch Smith

Nebraska allows Keystone XL Pipeline, but
picks a different path

11/20/17

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Mitch Smith

With big oil spill to clean, pipeline owner
seeks Keystone XL Approval

11/17/17

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Mitch Smith and
Julie Bosman

Keystone Pipeline leaks 210,000 gallons of
oil in South Dakota

11/16/17

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Mitch Smith

Risen from the grave, Keystone XL
Pipeline again divides Nebraska

4/27/17
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New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Clifford Krauss

US, in reversal, issues permit for Keystone
oil pipeline

3/24/17

New York
Times

Newspaper
article

Peter Baker and
Coral Davenport

Trump revives Keystone Pipeline rejected
by Obama

1/24/17

whitehouse.
gov*

Presidential
memoranda

Energy and
Environment

Presidential Memoranda Regarding
Construction of the Keystone XL Pipeline

1/24/17

whitehouse.
gov*

Remarks

Energy and
Environment -- Oval
Office

Remarks by the President in TransCanada
Keystone XL Pipeline Announcement

3/24/17

whitehouse.
gov*

Statement and
releases

Energy and
Environment

President Trump Expedites Priority Energy
and Infrastructure Projects

1/24/17

whitehouse.
gov*

Remarks

Energy and
Environment -- LNG
Export Terminal,
Hackberry,
Louisiana

Remarks by President Trump on Promoting
Energy Infrastructure and Economic
Growth | Hackberry, LA

5/14/19

whitehouse.
gov*

Remarks

Energy and
Environment -- US
Dept of Energy,
Washington, DC

Remarks by President Trump at the
Unleashing American Energy Event

6/29/17

whitehouse.
gov*

Remarks

Energy and
Environment -- Shell
Pennsylvania
Petrochemicals,
Monaca,
Pennsylvania

Remarks by President Trump on American
Energy and Manufacturing | Monaca, PA

8/13/19

whitehouse.
gov*

Remarks

Energy and
Environment -Environmental
Protection Agency,
Washington, DC

Remarks by President Trump at Signing of
Executive Order to Create Energy
Independence

3/28/17

Botswana
Source(s)

Source Type

Source Information
Author

Title

Date

Botswana Gazette

Newspaper article

Letlhogile Mpuang
and Tefo Pheage

Masisi, Khama escape
NPF charges

1/23/20

Botswana Gazette

Newspaper article

Admin

State pumps half a billion

8/5/19

39

into NPF
Botswana Gazette

Newspaper article

Gazette Reporters

Khama fights for financial
accounts seized by DISS

2/28/19

Botswana Guardian

Newspaper article

Portia Nkani

Petroleum Fund sitting at
P600 million

10/7/16

Botswana Guardian

Newspaper article

Moeti Mohwasa

DIS being used to settle
political scores

1/22/19

Botswana Guardian

Newspaper article

Nicholas Mokwena

Ngakaagae, Kgosi face off
in court duel

4/20/18

Botswana Guardian

Newspaper article

Nicholas Mokwena

Kgosi, owns up to NPF’s
P118 million

4/20/18

Botswana Guardian

Newspaper article

Nicholas Mokwena

Big fish hauled in NPF
P250m net

12/4/18

South Africa
Source (s)

Source Type

Source Information
Author

Title

Date

Gupta-leaks.com

Website article

Sally Evans

#Guptaleaks: UK PR Firm Tried to Push
White Monopoly Capital Agenda

6/1/17

Gupta-leaks.com

Website article

Sally Evans

#Guptaleaks: Duduzane Zuma, kept and
captured

6/1/17

Gupta-leaks.com

Website article

Kelly Anderson

#Guptaleaks:The Captured Presidency

7/19/17

Gupta-leaks.com

Website article

Sally Evans

Why you should care about the
#Guptaleaks - an international view

8/9/17
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